

# **Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2022**

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Approved for Release by:

Office of the Secretary of the Navy

June 2021

The estimated cost of this report or study for the Department of Defense is approximately \$228,000 in Fiscal Year 2021. This includes \$20,000 in expenses and \$208,000 in DoD labor.

Generated on 2021May26 RefID: E-4E1C

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# **Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels**

## **I. Reporting Requirement**

This report is submitted per Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code. Appendices 1 - 4 provide supporting details.

## **II. Submission of the Report**

This report is the Department of the Navy (DON) 30-year shipbuilding plan for the FY2022 President's Budget (PB2022). PB2022 provides planned funding to procure ships included in FY2022.

This plan highlights the future vectors the Navy will assess in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and test in experimentation, to build a modernized naval force with sufficient size and capability to compete effectively, deter aggression, and, if required, win decisively in combat. This report aligns shipbuilding with the requirements of the President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and incorporates the most recent warfighting analysis available. The Department will submit a complete 30-year shipbuilding plan with the President's Budget for FY2023 (PB2023).

## **III. Analytic Context**

As detailed in the 9 December 2020 Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels, the Department previously completed significant analytic work with the Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment (INFSA) and the Future Naval Force Study (FNFS). Analysis continues that will further define the capabilities required to maintain military advantage in peer military competition over the next several decades.

To compete and win in an era of peer military competition, the United States needs a balanced naval force capable of striking targets in all domains. The force design must emphasize distributed awareness, lethality, and survivability in high-intensity conflict. The force must be adaptable, demonstrate presence, achieve sea control, and be capable of projecting power by delivering precision effects at long ranges. The Navy, working closely with the OSD Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), continues to develop comparative assessments of naval force structure options consistent with Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and designed to maximize the maritime contribution to the joint force. The results of these efforts and ongoing experimentation and prototyping will be reflected in the FY2023 shipbuilding plan.

The Department is conducting analysis to refine understanding of the readiness and performance of the fleet against a future near-peer competitor capable of global operations. Furthermore, the DON continues to evaluate the industrial base pivot points required to support future platform development and the industrial base development needed for these future planned platforms, such as the next generation attack submarine (SSN(X)) and the future large surface combatant (DDG(X)), including land-based testing to enable success in these future programs.

The outcomes of this analytic work provide key insights in describing the objective battle force. These insights include:

### Subsurface

- Maintaining the undersea advantage is a priority for the Navy. As the Navy's most survivable strike platforms, SSNs and SSBNs are key to both deterrence and winning conflict against a rival power. To meet the demand for additional submarines, industrial base capacity must be expanded. The plan beyond the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) reflects an increase in SSN production that is fully realized with the conclusion of the *Columbia* class procurement and delivery. We continue to evaluate the industrial base capacity increase required for more consistent delivery of two SSNs per year during *Columbia* serial production and subsequent potential increases to SSN procurement.

### Carrier Aviation

- Nuclear powered carriers (CVNs) and carrier air wings (CVWs), the Joint Force's most survivable and adaptable aviation basing option, provide sea control and power projection in contested battlespace, offering a uniquely valuable combination of maneuver, operational reach, volume of fires, sustainability, and organic sensors.
- New capability concepts like a light aircraft carrier continue to be studied and analyzed to fully illuminate their potential to execute key mission elements in a more distributed manner and to inform the best mix of a future force.

### Surface

- Large Surface Combatants, most notably DDG 51 Flt III and the planned DDG(X), directly support Distributed Maritime Operations and are key to Sea Denial and Sea Control missions. Increased numbers of small multi-mission combatants, such as Constellation Class Frigates (FFG 62), enable more efficient distribution of missions across the surface fleet, freeing up more capable assets (CGs and DDGs) for critical high-end missions. The FNFS indicated that growing the small surface combatant force enables reductions in the quantity of large surface combatants while yielding a more distributed and lethal force.

### Amphibious Ships

- The USMC is reducing a number of legacy systems to reinvest in development of more relevant capabilities, such as Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs), as outlined in the Commandant's Planning Guidance and Force Design. The FNFS highlighted the important contributions MLRs may provide to Sea Denial and Sea Control missions. This approach requires a new mix of amphibious warships (LHA/LPD) and includes the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), which is an enabler of MLR mobility and sustainability. The overall number of amphibious warships grows to support the more distributed expeditionary force design, with LAWs complementing a smaller number of traditional amphibious warships.

### Combat Logistics Platforms (CLF)

- Logistics forces, to include traditional fleet oilers (T-AOs) and the newly planned smaller Next Generation Logistics Ships (NGLS), are key to the sustainability of the fleet and Fleet Marine Force during conflict with a capable rival. The FNFS highlighted the value of increased numbers of T-AOs and NGLS platforms, improving sustainability at sea. The final CLF force size and mix will continue to evolve pending additional study. Sealift is covered in additional detail in Appendix 4.

### Support Vessels

- Support vessels include enabler ships such as fleet tugs, salvage and rescue ships, submarine tenders, command ships, ocean surveillance ships, and fast transports. New submarine tenders will be constructed to support the Navy's new SSNs and SSBNs. Future requirements for fast transports decreased given complementary changes in the objective force, decreasing the overall support vessel quantity. Given their flexibility, additional missions for the fast transport vessels are being evaluated.

### Uncrewed Platforms

- Medium Unmanned Surface Vessels (MUSVs) can add substantial, distributed, low-cost forward sensors and C2 nodes.
- Large Unmanned Surface Vessels (LUSVs) show promise as a distributed weapons payload capacity at an affordable cost while also being a platform for sensors and other larger mission packages. LUSVs are initially envisioned to operate as adjunct fires magazines (i.e., munitions supply) teamed with larger manned multi-mission platforms to minimize technical risk and maximize survivability.
- Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs), a modular design UUV, will have the capability to deliver multiple payloads at extended ranges.
- USVs are being evaluated for various logistics missions.
- The Navy is committed to actively testing concepts of operations and employment of these platforms to iteratively assess and fully develop their capabilities.

## **IV. FY2022 Context**

Appendix 1 of this plan shows the funding requested in FY2022 to procure eight battle force ships. The Department will submit a complete 30-year shipbuilding plan with the President's Budget for FY2023.

In the interim, the Department will continue to build on ongoing analysis, experimentation, testing, prototyping, and the analytic results from force structure assessments, future fleet architectures, and intelligence updates to refine required capabilities and characterize the technical and operational risk of an objective battle force in military competition. This work will inform the content and transition pace to the future force and be reflected in the FY2023 shipbuilding plan.

## **V. Plan Objectives – Priorities**

This plan reflects the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and Department-level guidance for Navy budget submissions since 2019:

- Fully fund recapitalization of the SSBN fleet with *Columbia* class SSBN
- Prioritize readiness to deliver a combat-credible forward force in the near-term
- Invest in increased lethality/modernization with the greatest potential to deliver warfighting advantages against China and Russia in mid-to-far-term
- Grow warfighting capacity at a rate supported by our ability to sustain that capacity in the future.

## **VI. Unmanned Campaign Framework**

The DON released the Unmanned Campaign Framework to innovate and adapt new technology with which to build a more lethal and distributed naval force. To compete and win in an era of peer military competition, the Department is committed to investing in advanced autonomy, networks, and uncrewed systems to create true integrated human-machine teaming across the fleet. The Navy initiated “Project Overmatch” in support of this effort. As these systems advance in capability, they will become key enablers through all phases of warfare and in all warfare domains.

The Navy is accelerating the fielding of a full spectrum of uncrewed capabilities. These systems are included in wargames, exercises, fleet battle problems and limited real-world operations to derive employment plans and concepts of operation. Uncrewed systems are funded in the Navy’s research and development investments and accounted for in detail in each warfare domain’s Capability Evolution Plan. Learning from land-based testing and functional prototypes will support continued refinement of platform requirements and procurement profiles.

## **VII. Industrial Base**

The naval construction and repair industrial base continues to be the fundamental enabler for achieving and sustaining the Navy’s future fleet. Supporting and growing our shipbuilding and supporting vendor base is a national security imperative. Our industrial base requires a commitment to steady acquisition profiles to maintain a skilled workforce with the capability and capacity required to build and maintain the Navy’s future fleet.

To summarize the more complete explanation provided in previous reports, and to keep a clear eye on historical context, the “boom and bust” profiles of the last 60-plus years resulted in sharp peaks followed by significant valleys (sometimes breaks) in production. The examples shown in recent shipbuilding plans provided insight into why workforce experience and efficiency has become more difficult to reconstitute, and how that fundamentally contributed to longer, more expensive shipbuilding timelines. The buildup in the 1950s and 1980s, followed by “bust” periods of little production, each led to the loss of portions of our shipbuilding industrial base. The “boom” periods also led to large-scale block obsolescence as types/classes of ships reached (or will reach) the end of their service lives simultaneously, ultimately driving the need for another “boom” to recover. Without consistent and continuous commitment to steady acquisition profiles the industrial base will continue to struggle and some elements may not recover from another “boom/bust” cycle.

Congress has been a great partner in supporting the industrial base and the Navy greatly appreciates this commitment to shipbuilding. Over the past two years the Congress has appropriated \$478M in support of increasing industry capacity / supplier health. As stated in last year’s report, the Navy will continue to collaborate with industry to define and establish workable requirements and to partner with Congress to sustain predictable profiles. Additionally, the Navy will continue to proactively collaborate with industry to understand and positively affect vendor-based health factors such as workforce size / qualifications. The best way to provide the confidence for industry to invest in capital improvements is stable funding and commitment to future workload.

## **VIII. FY2022 Shipbuilding Plan Overview**

The PB2022 30-year shipbuilding plan includes procurement of eight ships in FY2022. The Department will submit a complete 30-year shipbuilding plan with the President's Budget for FY2023. Notable components of this report include:

- Continues funding for the *Columbia* class SSBN program.
- Continues to meet full funding requirements for CVN 80/CVN 81.
- Continues funding for the Block V multi-year procurement (MYP) FY2019 to FY2023 for 10 *Virginia* class submarines, 9 with Virginia Payload Modules (VPM).
- Procures one DDG 51 Flight III ship in FY2022, totaling eleven Flight III procurements across FY2018 to FY2022.
- Continues planned procurement of one FFG 62 in FY22.
- Procures one T-AO 205 class fleet oiler in FY2022.
- Continues the plan to initiate the T-AGOS(X) program in FY2022.
- Accelerates the T-ATS program by adding one ship in FY2022.
- Continues the recapitalization of the surge sealift fleet with the procurement of five used vessels in FY2022.

## **IX. Building the Future Navy Fleet**

Previous shipbuilding plans highlighted the fiscal challenge associated with the combination of strategic recapitalization – procurement of the *Columbia* class SSBN – and the imperative to invest in readiness, improve lethality, and field a larger peer military competition fleet. The Navy is collaborating with OSD to define the most effective future battle force.

## **X. Summary**

The Navy is actively working to build and sustain a larger, more capable force that supports future warfighting concepts in this era of competition. This 30-year shipbuilding plan reflects the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance priority to build that larger and more lethal force.

## Appendix 1

### PB2022 Battle Force Shipbuilding Plan

Table A1-1 includes the President's Budget (PB2022) funding for FY2022.

**Table A1-1 FY2022 Funding for Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy (SCN)**

| FY22                          |         |               |          |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------------|----------|
| Ship Type                     | (TY\$M) | \$            | Qty      |
| CVN <sup>1</sup>              |         | 2,368         |          |
| DDG 51                        |         | 2,017         | 1        |
| FFG 62                        |         | 1,157         | 1        |
| SSN 774                       |         | 6,370         | 2        |
| SSBN 826 <sup>2</sup>         |         | 4,647         |          |
| LPD 17 Flt II                 |         | 61            |          |
| LHA 9 <sup>3</sup>            |         | 69            |          |
| T-AO 205                      |         | 744           | 1        |
| T-ATS 6                       |         | 184           | 2        |
| T-AGOS (X) <sup>4</sup>       |         | 434           | 1        |
| <b>Total New Construction</b> |         | <b>18,051</b> | <b>8</b> |

Notes:

1. Funding reflects the two-CVN procurement for CVN 80 and CVN 81.
2. FY2022 includes incremental funding for the lead ship and other funding for AP for the 2<sup>nd</sup> ship, and economic order quantity funding for multiple ships.
3. Incremental procurement funding for LHA 9 is in FY2022 with prior year funding in FY2019 and FY2021.
4. New ships planned for future procurement or for replacement of legacy ships are annotated with (X) until their class has been named, such as T-AGOS(X) and AS(X).

Notable procurement activity in the PB2022 budget submission includes:

- Continues to meet full incremental funding requirements for CVN 80 and CVN 81.
- Continues to fund the Block V multi-year procurement in FY2022 for the FY2019 to FY2023 MYP for ten *Virginia* class submarines, nine with Virginia Payload Modules (VPM).
- Continues the second year of incremental funding for the lead *Columbia* class SSBN.
- Procures one T-AO 205 class fleet oiler in FY2022 and increases the T-ATS 6 procurements by one hull to two ships in FY2022.

### Long-Range Naval Vessel Battle Force Inventory

The concepts of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) / Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) require a balanced and different mix of traditional battle force ships and new amphibious and logistic ships. This will result in greater combat power than previous force structures in addition to new and key roles played by uncrewed platforms. These concepts and capabilities are being analyzed, tested, experimented, and exercised to better define a future objective battle force.

DMO addresses the challenges to sea control and access in highly contested and

information complex environments. It aligns with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. This concept describes required capabilities to execute distributed maritime operations with massed effects. DMO represents the intellectual framework necessary to evolve our fleet to meet the challenges of the future.

The Department continues to study a range of solutions to provide lethal warfighting capability to maintain sea control and power projection under the framework of DMO. Study areas include, but are not limited to, the future aircraft carrier, Next Generation Logistics Ship, amphibious ships, and the next generation attack submarine. Ongoing analysis and experimentation will define required combat effectiveness and emphasize the focus on warfighting capability and readiness. This analysis and experimentation will be informed by operationally relevant metrics including, but not limited to, lethality, survivability, operational reach, vertical launch system cells, torpedo tubes, sortie generation rates, lift capacity, affordability, and industrial base viability and capacity.

**Table A1-2 Potential Naval Platform Ranges**

| Platforms                                     | Naval Platform Ranges |            |
|---|-----------------------|------------|
|   | Low                   | High       |
| Aircraft Carriers                             | 9                     | 11         |
| LHA/LHD                                       | 8                     | 9          |
| Large Amphibious Warfare Ships (less LHA/LHD) | 16                    | 19         |
| Small Amphibious Warfare Ships <sup>1</sup>   | 24                    | 35         |
| Large Surface Combatant                       | 63                    | 65         |
| Small Surface Combatant                       | 40                    | 45         |
| Attack Submarines / Large Payload Submarine   | 66                    | 72         |
| Ballistic Missile Submarines                  | 12                    | 12         |
| Combat Logistics Force <sup>2</sup>           | 56                    | 75         |
| Support Vessels                               | 27                    | 29         |
| Total Battle Force Ships                      | <b>321</b>            | <b>372</b> |
| Uncrewed Surface Vessels                      | 59                    | 89         |
| Uncrewed Undersea Vessels                     | 18                    | 51         |
| Total Uncrewed                                | <b>77</b>             | <b>140</b> |
| Total Battle Force Ships + Uncrewed           | <b>398</b>            | <b>512</b> |

Notes:

1. Includes the future Light Amphibious Warship
2. Includes the future next generation logistics ship

Table A1-2 depicts ranges for critical naval platforms that, taken together with broader Naval and Joint Force capabilities, incorporate combat effectiveness, production feasibility, and likely fiscal limits. Investment priorities include ensuring sufficient capacity in our survivable and lethal submarine force, maintaining the Joint Force’s most survivable and adaptable aviation base in the aircraft carrier, and increasing the small surface combatant force to better support distributed maritime operations. This objective force also recognizes the important contributions of the combat logistics force, which is critical to sustainability of the fleet and Fleet Marine Force during great power competition and conflict.

New production platforms, such as uncrewed systems, NGLS, and LAW, bring great potential, but also have greater developmental risk. This is represented by a wider objective range. As prototyping and experimentation retire technical and CONOPS uncertainty and risk,

along with a clearer understanding of the associated costs, we expect that the objective force ranges will narrow.

## **Appendix 2**

### **Annual Funding for Battle Force Ship Construction and Sustainment**

The fiscal impact of the *Columbia* class, last recapitalized from FY1974 to FY1989, began in earnest in FY2021 with procurement of the lead SSBN, and grows across the FYDP to FY2026 when annual full procurements will be required as the ships go into serial production. That procurement will continue through FY2035. This represents the Navy's single largest fiscal challenge for future budgets over the next 15 years.

Next generation ships and submarines are in the early stages of requirements definition, and their cost uncertainty compounds further in the out years of the plan. Costs are being estimated and the impact on overall force mix will be determined within the ongoing work of the future fleet architecture analysis and associated experimentation discussed in Appendix 1.

Additionally, the Navy will assess the cost to operate and sustain a larger Navy composed of smaller but more numerous ships. As the Navy determines an objective future battle force, the sustainment cost determined to maintain that larger battle force will be factored into the ability to reach and sustain it.

## Appendix 3

### Planned Decommissionings, Dismantlings, and Disposals

This addendum report is in compliance with the Senate Armed Services Committee request for additional information regarding decommissioning and disposal of naval vessels. Table A3-1 lists the battle force ships to be inactivated in FY2022 and their planned dispositions. The table also identifies the planned disposition for each ship. There are no potential gaps in warfighting capability that will result from the projected ships being removed from service. The Navy will continue to analyze service life extensions for the most capable warships each year.

**Table A3-1 Ships Planned to be Inactivated<sup>1</sup> in FY2022**

| Inactivation Year<br>(FY) - Total Ships | Ship Name / Designation / Hull Number | Disposition |
|---|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| 2022<br>15 Battle Force Ships           | USS SAN JACINTO (CG 56)               | OCIR        |
|   | USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CG 57)            | OCIR        |
|   | USS MONTEREY (CG 61)                  | OCIR        |
|   | USS HUE CITY (CG 66)                  | OCIR        |
|   | USS ANZIO (CG 68)                     | OCIR        |
|   | USS VELLA GULF (CG 72)                | OCIR        |
|   | USS PORT ROYAL (CG 73)                | OCIR        |
|   | USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3)                | OCIR        |
|   | USS CORONADO (LCS 4)                  | OCIR        |
|   | USS DETROIT (LCS 7)                   | OCIR        |
|   | USS LITTLE ROCK (LCS 9)               | OCIR        |
|   | USS WHIDBEY ISLAND (LSD 41)           | OCIR        |
|   | USS PROVIDENCE (SSN 719)              | RECYCLE     |
|   | USS OKLAHOMA CITY (SSN 723)           | RECYCLE     |
|   | USNS APACHE (T-ATF 172)               | DISPOSAL    |

Notes:

1. US Navy vessels are commissioned ships that are decommissioned and removed from active status. USNS vessels are non-commissioned vessels that are placed out of service.
2. Out of Commission in Reserve (OCIR) ships will be retained on the Naval Vessel Register as reactivation candidates.

### Ships planned for dismantling and SINKEX during the FYDP

Prior to final disposition, ships reaching the end of their service lives are evaluated for additional use through intra-agency or inter-agency transfer, foreign military sales (FMS), fleet training, or weapons testing. Ships designated for FMS are retained in a hold status for no more than two years in accordance with Navy policy. The Navy intends to dismantle the ships listed in Table A3-2. Specific dates will be determined when the ships are contracted for scrapping or recycling.

**Table A3-2 Ships Planned for Disposal by Dismantling**

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Existing Inventory:<br>Ex-PONCE (AFSB(I) 15)<br>Ex-HAYES (AG 195)<br>Ex-MOHAWK (ATF 170)<br>Ex-YORKTOWN (CG 48)<br>Ex-KITTY HAWK (CV 63)<br>Ex-JOHN F KENNEDY (CV 67)<br>Ex-JOHN L HALL (FFG 32)<br>Ex-UNDERWOOD (FFG 36)<br>Ex-NICHOLAS (FFG 47)<br>Ex-SAMUEL B ROBERTS (FFG 58)<br>Ex-CHARLESTON (LKA 113)<br>Ex-MOBILE (LKA 115) | Ex-JUNEAU (LPD 10)<br>Ex-SHREVEPORT (LPD 12)<br>Ex-NASHVILLE (LPD 13)<br>Ex-BOULDER (LST 1190)<br>Ex-CANON (PG 90)<br>Ex-CHAMPION (MCM 4)<br>Ex-SCOUT (MCM 8)<br>Ex-ARDENT (MCM 12)<br>Ex-SIOUX (T-ATF 171)<br>EX-BONHOMME RICHARD (LHD 6)<br>Ex-DUBUQUE (LPD 8)<br>Ex-CLEVELAND (LPD 7)<br>Ex-EL PASO (LKA 117) |
| Additions in FY2022:<br>USNS APACHE (T-ATF 172)   |  |

Table A3-3 lists the ships that will be used for fleet training in support of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) and Valiant Shield training exercises that will occur during the FYDP. The training will include using selected decommissioned ships as targets for live-fire weapons employment, referred to as a “sinking exercise” (SINKEX). The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) guidelines authorize SINKEXs when: (1) the event is required to satisfy Title 10 requirements for ship survivability or weapons lethality evaluation; or (2) the event supports major joint or multi-national exercises or evaluation of significant new multi-unit tactics or tactics and weapons combinations.

**Table A3-3 Ships Planned for Use in Future Fleet Training Exercises**

|                            |                      |
|----------------------------|----------------------|
| Ex-RODNEY M DAVIS (FFG 60) | Ex-INGRAHAM (FFG 61) |
| Ex-VANDEGRIFT (FFG 48)     | Ex-DENVER (LPD 9)    |
| Ex-BOONE (FFG 28)          |                      |

**Summary**

Navy will inactivate 15 ships in FY2022 (Table A3-1): 12 will be designated OCIR; 2 will be recycled; 1 will be slated for disposal. This will bring the total number of ships designated for dismantlement to 26 (Table A3-2, 25 previously inactivated ships and 1 ship added during FY2022). Five ships are designated for fleet training support (SINKEX) (Table A3-3). The dispositions in the plan will be reassessed during the annual Ship Disposition Reviews.

## Appendix 4

### Auxiliary and Sealift Shipbuilding Plan (FY2022)

Per the National Defense Strategy, auxiliary and sealift vessels provide support to the joint force, battle force, shore-based facilities, and broader national security missions.

#### Auxiliary Force Structure

Non-battle force auxiliary ships are operating platforms designed for unique United States military and federal government missions including oceanographic and hydrographic surveys, underwater surveillance, missile tracking and data collection, acoustic research and submarine support. Tables A4-1 and A4-2 depict current and required inventories.

**Table A4-1 Auxiliary Vessels Owned and Operated by DON**

| Type                               | Current Inventory | Required Inventory |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Oceanographic survey ships (AGS)   | 6                 | 8                  |
| Navigation test support ship (AGS) | 1                 | 1                  |
| Submarine escort ships (AGSE)      | 4                 | 4                  |
| Hospital ships (AH)                | 2                 | 2                  |
| Cable repair ships (ARC)           | 1                 | 2                  |
| High speed transport (HST)         | 1                 | -                  |
| <b>Total</b>                       | <b>15</b>         | <b>17</b>          |

**Table A4-2 Auxiliary Vessels Procured by DON and Operated by Other Services/Agencies**

| Type                                     | Current Inventory | Required Inventory |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|
| Missile range instrumentation ship (AGM) | 2                 | 2                  |
| Oceanographic research ships (AGOR)      | 6                 | 6                  |
| <b>Total</b>                             | <b>8</b>          | <b>8</b>           |

#### Organic Sealift Force Structure

Strategic sealift is a key enabler of DMO, sea control, and power projection. Sealift ships transport approximately 90 percent of Army and Marine Corps combat unit equipment and supplies in support of major combat operations. Organic (U.S. government-owned) sealift capability combines afloat prepositioning vessels in a forward-deployed, full operating status and Surge vessels, maintained in 5-day reduced operating status (ROS-5) lay berthed in the continental United States, with special purpose ships necessary to provide intermodal transfer capabilities for fuel and cargo. Strategic sealift vessels have an average age of approximately 40 years and are in need of recapitalization. Table A4-3 depicts inventory contributing to organic, strategic sealift requirements.

**Table A4-3 Organic Strategic Sealift Inventory**

| Type                                      | Current Inventory     | Required Inventory    |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Crane ships (ACS) <sup>1</sup>            | 6                     | 4                     |
| Offshore petroleum distribution (AG/OPDS) | 2                     | 1                     |
| Cargo vehicle ships (AK/AKR) <sup>3</sup> | 30                    | 23                    |
| Aviation logistics ships (AVB)            | 2                     | 2                     |
| Cargo vehicle ships (RORO) <sup>3</sup>   | 35                    | 53                    |
| Heavy lift ships <sup>2</sup>             | 2                     | 0                     |
| <b>Total</b>                              | <b>77<sup>4</sup></b> | <b>83<sup>4</sup></b> |

Notes:

1. Installation of cranes on Air Force container ships alleviated requirement for 2 of 6 crane ships.
2. Heavy lift (barge-carriers) no longer required per DOD strategic sealift mission analysis.
3. The number of cargo vehicle ships in the Strategic Sealift fleet will vary depending on the capacity of individual vessels contributing to the 15.3 million square foot lift requirement.
4. Inventories exclude eight afloat prepositioning ships. Four ships are counted within Navy’s battle force. The remaining four ships are leased container vessels.

Afloat prepositioning vessels operate under Military Sealift Command (MSC) to support Air Force, Army, and Navy/Marine Corps requirements. Afloat Prepositioning (PrePo) consists of 24 total ships; 15 Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO) and nine special capability. These forward deployed ships provide 4.7M ft<sup>2</sup> of RORO capacity. They have an average age of 25 years, are government owned and commercially operated. This appendix includes 16 PrePo ships because eight are not considered auxiliary ships; four are special capability ships that are included in the battle force command/support ships category and the other four are leased container ships.

Navy resources the procurement of all afloat prepositioning ships as well as operations and sustainment of Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) for the US Marine Corps. Army and Air Force resource the operations and sustainment for their afloat prepositioning ships and confirm that the current vessels continue to meet requirements. DON has initiated new construction requirements development for the Next Generation MPF to align delivery of the first ship with ships aging out of the force in 2030.

PB22 continues Navy’s commitment to surge sealift requirements through procurement of used vessels to replace aging surge sealift capacity and conversion/upgrade of all newly-procured used RORO vessels to be performed in U.S. shipyards in a profile closely aligned to the procurement schedule. The recapitalization plan also includes adjustments to the existing fleet with service life extension of the ten most viable platforms, retirement of the seven least-ready roll-on/roll-off vessels, retirement of four special mission ships, continued investment in platform maintenance, and consolidation of the Surge Sealift and Ready Reserve Force. Table A4-4 provides the funding required to procure five used vessels in FY 2022.

Through FY21, the organic surge sealift capability is provided by the Surge Sealift Force (owned and operated by MSC) and the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), owned by Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Maritime Administration (MARAD) and operated by MSC. DoD and DOT will begin to consolidate this capability into the Ready Reserve Force in FY22. All surge

sealift vessels remain Navy-resourced, government-owned, and contractor-operated in a ROS-5 status to enable contingency response. All vessels are MSC-operated when activated.

**Table A4-4 Funding – SCN and OMN**

| Ship Type (\$M)          | FY 2022    |          |
|--------------------------|------------|----------|
|                          | \$         | Qty      |
| RORO (Used Vessels)      | 369        | 5        |
| <b>Total Procurement</b> | <b>369</b> | <b>5</b> |

**Notes:**

1. Surge Sealift Used Vessels are commercial RORO vehicle cargo carriers procured in SCN with conversion to meet lift requirements funded in Operations and Maintenance, Navy (OM,N) for transfer by General Provision to the Ready Reserve Force, Maritime Administration.